The Unity of Normative Thought.
Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is our will, not an intellectual capacity whose exercises can influence those of our will. If practical reason is our will, thoughts about how I am to act have an essential tie to action. They are intentions. Thoughts about how others are to ac...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 104; no. 3; pp. 639 - 659 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158260558&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158260558 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2022 vid: 104 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 158260558 10.1111/phpr.12798 ppf: 639 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 782KB tig: atl: The Unity of Normative Thought. aug: su: Cognitive psychology Human beings Delusions Intention Critical analysis sug: subj: Cognitive psychology Human beings Delusions Intention Critical analysis ab: Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is our will, not an intellectual capacity whose exercises can influence those of our will. If practical reason is our will, thoughts about how I am to act have an essential tie to action. They are intentions. Thoughts about how others are to act, though, lack such a tie to action. They are beliefs, not intentions. How, then, can these thoughts form a unified class? I reject two answers which deny the differences between such thoughts about myself and those about others, one of which says that all such thoughts are intentions, the other that all are beliefs. I then reject a shared assumption which says that a class of those is unified only if all its elements are all of one type of thought. I instead argue that this class is unified even though some elements are intentions, others beliefs, because such beliefs depend on those intentions in various ways. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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