Descartes and his critics on passions and animals.
Descartes' theory of the passions has important connections to his view that nonhuman animals are automata. In this paper, I show how critics of animal automatism exploited these connections. I interpret a criticism of animal automatism developed by Gabriel Daniel (1649–1728). Daniel argues that ani...
| Publicado en: | British Journal for the History of Philosophy Vol. 30; no. 5; pp. 773 - 797 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158478292&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158478292 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09608788 5AX jtl: British Journal for the History of Philosophy issn: 09608788 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2022 vid: 30 iid: 5 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 158478292 10.1080/09608788.2021.2024494 ppf: 773 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.6MB tig: atl: Descartes and his critics on passions and animals. aug: au: Thomas, Evan affil: Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, USA su: Automatism (Consciousness) Daniel, Gabriel Animals Cartesianism (Philosophy) Phenomenology sug: subj: Automatism (Consciousness) Daniel, Gabriel Animals Cartesianism (Philosophy) Phenomenology keyword: animals Descartes Gabriel Daniel mechanism passions ab: Descartes' theory of the passions has important connections to his view that nonhuman animals are automata. In this paper, I show how critics of animal automatism exploited these connections. I interpret a criticism of animal automatism developed by Gabriel Daniel (1649–1728). Daniel argues that animal automatism commits Descartes to an implausible account of the phenomenology of conflicts between passion and reason. If animal bodies act by mere automatic mechanism, then when a human being resists their animal impulses they should experience a conflict between the disposition of their body and their rational soul. However, our experience of conflicts between passion and reason instead suggests that these conflicts are internal to the soul. Daniel's objection to Cartesian animal automatism was later criticized by David Renaud Boullier (1699–1759), but Boullier himself raises an objection to Cartesian animal automatism that develops insights from Daniel. I argue that Boullier succeeds in raising a powerful objection to Cartesian animal automatism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of British Journal for the History of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: British Journal for the History of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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