The Right Argument from Moral Disagreement.
The anti‐realist's argument from moral disagreement has prematurely fallen out of favor. The argument has never been stated explicitly in correct form, and its proponents have not appealed to the best examples to support its premises. Realists have responded with a multitude of possible replies with...
| Publicado en: | Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 88; no. 4; pp. 850 - 868 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Aug2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158528946&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158528946 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00405825 HL0 jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy issn: 00405825 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Aug2022 vid: 88 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 158528946 10.1111/theo.12401 ppf: 850 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 186KB tig: atl: The Right Argument from Moral Disagreement. aug: su: Intra-party disagreements (Political parties) Ethics Collectivism (Political science) Individualism Sociology sug: subj: Intra-party disagreements (Political parties) Ethics Collectivism (Political science) Individualism Sociology keyword: collectivism individualism moral disagreement ab: The anti‐realist's argument from moral disagreement has prematurely fallen out of favor. The argument has never been stated explicitly in correct form, and its proponents have not appealed to the best examples to support its premises. Realists have responded with a multitude of possible replies without applying them to the most convincing examples of irresolvable disagreements. The argument is a modus ponens from apparent fundamental disagreements to a disjunction of possible explanations, and then a disjunctive argument eliminating all but one alternative. The most convincing example from the point of view of the anti‐realist is the disagreement between the collectivist and the individual rights advocate, which occurs on both the levels of principle and individual judgment. Realist explanations for such disagreements include ignorance of nonmoral facts, application of principles in diverse contexts, bias, faulty reasoning, incommensurability or ties, lack of empathy or imagination, inaccessibility of moral facts, or different meanings for moral terms. I argue that none of these realist explanations for the disagreement between the collectivist and the individualist works, leaving only the anti‐realist explanation. Other realist moves, for example analogies with other areas of discourse, including disagreement among meta‐ethicists, are also shown to fail. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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