Arbitrariness and the long road to permissivism.
Radically permissive ontologies like mereological universalism and material plenitude are typically motivated by concerns about arbitrariness or anthropocentrism: it would be objectionably arbitrary, the thought goes, to countenance only those objects that we ordinarily take there to be. Despite the...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 56; no. 3; pp. 619 - 639 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158677743&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158677743 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2022 vid: 56 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 158677743 10.1111/nous.12376 ppf: 619 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 225KB tig: atl: Arbitrariness and the long road to permissivism. aug: su: Anthropocentrism Metaphysics Motivation (Psychology) Roads Argument Environmental ethics sug: subj: Anthropocentrism Metaphysics Motivation (Psychology) Roads Argument Environmental ethics ab: Radically permissive ontologies like mereological universalism and material plenitude are typically motivated by concerns about arbitrariness or anthropocentrism: it would be objectionably arbitrary, the thought goes, to countenance only those objects that we ordinarily take there to be. Despite the prevalence of this idea, it isn't at all clear what it is for a theory to be "objectionably arbitrary", or what follows from a commitment to avoiding arbitrariness in metaphysics. This paper aims to clarify both questions, and examines whether arguments from arbitrariness really are the proper foundations for one or both varieties of ontological permissivism. I argue that these considerations (even when made more precise) are far less successful at motivating radical forms of permissivism than we often take them to be. To do better, permissivists must either supply a much more developed metaphysics of material objects, or a controversial (but tempting) conception of what we're doing when we do metaphysics. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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