Fragmentation and logical omniscience.
It would be good to have a Bayesian decision theory that assesses our decisions and thinking according to everyday standards of rationality—standards that do not require logical omniscience (Garber, 1983; Hacking, 1967). To that end we develop a "fragmented" decision theory in which a single state o...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 56; no. 3; pp. 716 - 742 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158677748&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158677748 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2022 vid: 56 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 158677748 10.1111/nous.12381 ppf: 716 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 325KB tig: atl: Fragmentation and logical omniscience. aug: au: Elga, Adam Rayo, Agustín affil: Princeton University Massachusetts Institute of Technology su: Decision theory Expected utility Computer hacking Fragmented landscapes Reason sug: subj: Decision theory Expected utility Computer hacking Fragmented landscapes Reason ab: It would be good to have a Bayesian decision theory that assesses our decisions and thinking according to everyday standards of rationality—standards that do not require logical omniscience (Garber, 1983; Hacking, 1967). To that end we develop a "fragmented" decision theory in which a single state of mind is represented by a family of credence functions, each associated with a distinct choice condition (Lewis, 1982; Stalnaker, 1984). The theory imposes a local coherence assumption guaranteeing that as an agent's attention shifts, successive batches of "obvious" logical information become available to her. A rule of expected utility maximization can then be applied to the decision of what to attend to next during a train of thought. On the resulting theory, rationality requires ordinary agents to be logically competent and to often engage in trains of thought that increase the unification of their states of mind. But rationality does not require ordinary agents to be logically omniscient. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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