Indecision and Buridan’s Principle.
The problem known as Buridan’s Ass says that a hungry donkey equipoised between two identical bales of hay will starve to death. Indecision kills the ass. Some philosophers worry about human analogs. Computer scientists since the 1960s have known about the computer versions of such cases. From what...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 5; pp. 1 - 28 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158684665&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158684665 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2022 vid: 200 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 158684665 10.1007/s11229-022-03843-3 ppf: 1 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 315KB tig: atl: Indecision and Buridan’s Principle. aug: au: Coren, Daniel affil: Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, USA sug: keyword: Agency Akrasia Decision Jean Buridan Omission Responsibility ab: The problem known as Buridan’s Ass says that a hungry donkey equipoised between two identical bales of hay will starve to death. Indecision kills the ass. Some philosophers worry about human analogs. Computer scientists since the 1960s have known about the computer versions of such cases. From what Leslie Lamport calls ‘Buridan’s Principle’—a discrete decision based on a continuous range of input-values cannot be made in a bounded time—it follows that the possibilities for human analogs of Buridan’s Ass are far more wide-ranging and securely provable than has been acknowledged in philosophy. We are never necessarily decisive. This is mathematically provable. I explore four consequences: first, increased interest of the literature’s solutions to Buridan’s Ass; second, a new asymmetry between responsibility for omissions and responsibility for actions; third, clarification of the standard account of akrasia; and, fourth, clarification of the role of credences in normative decision-theory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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