Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems.
Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal t...
| Published in: | Logic & Logical Philosophy Vol. 31; no. 2; pp. 209 - 235 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Logic & Logical Philosophy
Jun2022
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158775929&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158775929 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 14253305 DS9 jtl: Logic & Logical Philosophy issn: 14253305 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2022 vid: 31 iid: 2 pid: 42904 pub: Logic & Logical Philosophy artinfo: ui: 158775929 10.12775/LLP.2022.007 ppf: 209 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems. aug: au: Tajer, Diego Fiore, Camillo affil: Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich, Germany Instituto de Filosofía Universidad de Buenos Aires Buenos Aires, Argentina su: Pluralism Logic sug: subj: Pluralism Logic keyword: collapse argument interpretations of logical systems logical pluralism pure and applied logics ab: Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal to this epistemic interpretation to briefly motivate a kind of logical pluralism: "different accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propositions". The aim of this paper is to study the prospect of a logical pluralism based on different interpretations of logical systems. First, we give our analysis of what it means to interpret a logic -- and make some hopefully useful distinctions along the way. Second, we present what we call an interpretational logical pluralism: there is more than one correct logic and a logic is correct only if it has some adequate interpretation. We consider four variants of this idea, bring up some possible objections, and try to find plausible solutions on behalf of the pluralist. We will argue that interpretations of logical systems provide a promising -- albeit not unproblematic -- route to logical pluralism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Logic & Logical Philosophy is the property of Logic & Logical Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Logic & Logical Philosophy holder: Logic & Logical Philosophy dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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