Nonhuman Value: A Survey of the Intrinsic Valuation of Natural and Artificial Nonhuman Entities.
To be intrinsically valuable means to be valuable for its own sake. Moral philosophy is often ethically anthropocentric, meaning that it locates intrinsic value within humans. This paper rejects ethical anthropocentrism and asks, in what ways might nonhumans be intrinsically valuable? The paper answ...
| Publicado en: | Science & Engineering Ethics Vol. 28; no. 5; pp. 1 - 30 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Oct2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158797383&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158797383 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13533452 GNI jtl: Science & Engineering Ethics issn: 13533452 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2022 vid: 28 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 158797383 10.1007/s11948-022-00388-z ppf: 1 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 990KB tig: atl: Nonhuman Value: A Survey of the Intrinsic Valuation of Natural and Artificial Nonhuman Entities. aug: au: Owe, Andrea Baum, Seth D. Coeckelbergh, Mark affil: Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, New York, USA Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria sug: keyword: Anthropocentrism Artificial intelligence Environmental ethics Ethics Intrinsic value Nonhumans ab: To be intrinsically valuable means to be valuable for its own sake. Moral philosophy is often ethically anthropocentric, meaning that it locates intrinsic value within humans. This paper rejects ethical anthropocentrism and asks, in what ways might nonhumans be intrinsically valuable? The paper answers this question with a wide-ranging survey of theories of nonhuman intrinsic value. The survey includes both moral subjects and moral objects, and both natural and artificial nonhumans. Literatures from environmental ethics, philosophy of technology, philosophy of art, moral psychology, and related fields are reviewed, and gaps in these literatures are identified. Although the gaps are significant and much work remains to be done, the survey nonetheless demonstrates that those who reject ethical anthropocentrism have considerable resources available to develop their moral views. Given the many very high-stakes issues involving both natural and artificial nonhumans, and the sensitivity of these issues to how nonhumans are intrinsically valued, this is a vital project to pursue. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Science & Engineering Ethics is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Science & Engineering Ethics holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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