What is Intelligence For? A Peircean Pragmatist Response to the Knowing-How, Knowing-That Debate.
Mainstream philosophy has seen a recent flowering in discussions of intellectualism which revisits Gilbert Ryle's famous distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that', and challenges his argument that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. These debates so far appear not to have engaged...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 5; pp. 2265 - 2285 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159159899&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159159899 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2022 vid: 87 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 159159899 10.1007/s10670-020-00301-9 ppf: 2265 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 623KB tig: atl: What is Intelligence For? A Peircean Pragmatist Response to the Knowing-How, Knowing-That Debate. aug: au: Legg, Catherine Black, Joshua affil: Philosophy Program, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Hwy, 3125, Burwood, VIC, Australia Philosophy Program, University of Canterbury, 20 Kirkwood Avenue, Upper Riccarton, 8041, Christchurch, New Zealand su: Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 Anti-intellectualism Habit Theory of knowledge Theory-practice relationship Virtue epistemology Pragmatism sug: subj: Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 Anti-intellectualism Habit Theory of knowledge Theory-practice relationship Virtue epistemology Pragmatism ab: Mainstream philosophy has seen a recent flowering in discussions of intellectualism which revisits Gilbert Ryle's famous distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that', and challenges his argument that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. These debates so far appear not to have engaged with pragmatist philosophy in any substantial way, which is curious as the relation between theory and practice is one of pragmatism's main themes. Accordingly, this paper examines the contemporary debate in the light of Charles Peirce's habit-based epistemology. We argue both that knowing-that can be understood as a particularly sophisticated form of knowing-how, and that all bodily competencies—if sufficiently deliberately developed—can be analysed as instantiating propositional structure broadly conceived. In this way, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism are seen to be not opposed, and both true, although Peirce's original naturalistic account of propositional structure does lead him to reject what we shall call 'linguistic intellectualism'. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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