Mighty Belief Revision.
Belief revision theories standardly endorse a principle of intensionality to the effect that ideal doxastic agents do not discriminate between pieces of information that are equivalent within classical logic. I argue that this principle should be rejected. Its failure, on my view, does not require f...
| Published in: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 51; no. 5; pp. 1175 - 1214 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Oct2022
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159213253&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159213253 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223611 JPH jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic issn: 00223611 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2022 vid: 51 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 159213253 10.1007/s10992-022-09663-7 ppf: 1175 ppct: 39 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 674KB tig: atl: Mighty Belief Revision. aug: au: Krämer, Stephan affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Hamburg, Überseering 35, 22297, Hamburg, Germany su: Counterfactuals (Logic) Semantics Logic Axioms Puzzles sug: subj: Counterfactuals (Logic) Semantics Logic Axioms Puzzles keyword: AGM Belief revision Counterfactuals Hyperintensionality Truthmaker semantics ab: Belief revision theories standardly endorse a principle of intensionality to the effect that ideal doxastic agents do not discriminate between pieces of information that are equivalent within classical logic. I argue that this principle should be rejected. Its failure, on my view, does not require failures of logical omniscience on the part of the agent, but results from a view of the update as mighty: as encoding what the agent learns might be the case, as well as what must be. The view is motivated by consideration of a puzzle case, obtained by transposing into the context of belief revision a kind of scenario that Kit Fine has used to argue against intensionalism about counterfactuals. Employing the framework of truthmaker semantics, I go on to develop a novel account of belief revision, based on a conception of the update as mighty, which validates natural hyperintensional counterparts of the usual AGM postulates. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Philosophical Logic holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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