Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments.
Various theorists contend that we might live in a computer simulation. David Chalmers, in turn, argues that the simulation hypothesis is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of our reality, rather than a sceptical scenario. We use recent work on consciousness to motivate new doubts about both...
| Published in: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 100; no. 3; pp. 496 - 509 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2022
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159267494&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159267494 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2022 vid: 100 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 159267494 10.1080/00048402.2021.1913621 ppf: 496 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 897KB tig: atl: Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments. aug: au: Summers, Micah Arvan, Marcus affil: The University of Tampa su: Argument Computer simulation Chalmers, David Hypothesis Panpsychism sug: subj: Argument Computer simulation Chalmers, David Hypothesis Panpsychism keyword: consciousness panpsychism panqualityism scepticism simulation ab: Various theorists contend that we might live in a computer simulation. David Chalmers, in turn, argues that the simulation hypothesis is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of our reality, rather than a sceptical scenario. We use recent work on consciousness to motivate new doubts about both sets of arguments. First, we argue that if either panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then the only way to live in a simulation might be as brains-in-vats, in which case it is unlikely that we live in a simulation. We then argue that, if panpsychism or panqualityism is true, viable simulation hypotheses are substantially sceptical scenarios. We conclude that the nature of consciousness has wide-ranging implications for simulation arguments. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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