Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck.
Does 'remembering that p ' entail 'knowing that p '? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory (hereafter, ETM) answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often 'vaguely remem...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 72; no. 4; pp. 896 - 918 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159312063&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159312063 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2022 vid: 72 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 159312063 10.1093/pq/pqab064 ppf: 896 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 228KB tig: atl: Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck. aug: au: Lai, Changsheng affil: Department of Philosophy, Shanghai Jiao Tong University , China su: Memory Theory of knowledge Epistemics Philosophy Psychology sug: subj: Memory Theory of knowledge Epistemics Philosophy Psychology keyword: anti-luck epistemology misremembering simulationism the epistemic theory of memory vaguely remember ab: Does 'remembering that p ' entail 'knowing that p '? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory (hereafter, ETM) answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often 'vaguely remember' a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on prominent theories of misremembering in philosophy of psychology (e.g. fuzzy-trace theory and simulationism), I will construct cases where the subject vaguely remembers that p while fails to meet the safety condition, which imply either that ETM is false or that safety is unnecessary for knowledge. The conclusion reached in this paper will be a conditional: if veritic epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge, then 'remembering that p ' does not entail 'knowing that p '. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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