The epistemic normativity of conjecture.

This paper has two aims: (1) it develops and defends a fully-fledged account of the epistemic normativity of conjecture (2) it goes sharply against orthodoxy, in arguing that conjecture is epistemically more demanding than assertion. According to the view defended here, one's conjecture that p is pe...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 179; no. 11; pp. 3447 - 3472
Autor principal: Simion, Mona
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Nov2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The epistemic normativity of conjecture.
      aug:
        au: Simion, Mona
        affil: COGITO Epistemology Research Centre, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
      su:
        Normativity (Ethics)
        Logical prediction
        Assertiveness (Psychology)
        Epistemic logic
        Modal logic
      sug:
        subj:
          Normativity (Ethics)
          Logical prediction
          Assertiveness (Psychology)
          Epistemic logic
          Modal logic
      keyword:
        Assertion
        Conjecture
        Epistemic norms
        Knowledge norm
      ab: This paper has two aims: (1) it develops and defends a fully-fledged account of the epistemic normativity of conjecture (2) it goes sharply against orthodoxy, in arguing that conjecture is epistemically more demanding than assertion. According to the view defended here, one's conjecture that p is permissible only if one knows that one has warrant, but not sufficient warrant to believe that p. I argue for my account on three independent grounds: (1) the Bach and Harnish account of the nature of communicative speech acts, (2) the plausible normative relation between assertion and other constatives, and (3) the normativity of belief in conjunction with constatives' epistemic function.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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