How radical is radical realism?
Radical realism is distinguished in part from other forms of political realism by its more explicit anti‐status quo objectives. In particular, radical realists generally reject the legitimacy of liberal political institutions, and often defend some version of Marxism or anarchism. However, critics o...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 30; no. 3; pp. 1110 - 1125 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159609493&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159609493 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2022 vid: 30 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 159609493 10.1111/ejop.12710 ppf: 1110 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: How radical is radical realism? aug: su: Photorealism Political realism Marxist philosophy Anarchism Radicalism sug: subj: Photorealism Political realism Marxist philosophy Anarchism Radicalism ab: Radical realism is distinguished in part from other forms of political realism by its more explicit anti‐status quo objectives. In particular, radical realists generally reject the legitimacy of liberal political institutions, and often defend some version of Marxism or anarchism. However, critics of radical realism sometimes argue that radical realist's aversion to certain kinds of normative theorising hinders their capacity to criticize the status quo. This objection may therefore be best understood as one of "self‐frustration," rather than "status quo bias." According to the objection, radical realists want to criticise the status quo, but their own methodological positions prevent them from doing so effectively. I have three aims in this article. First, I will clarify the kinds of normativity which radical realists do (and do not) object. Second, I will then show how this enables us to see that the self‐frustration objection fails. Third, I will suggest that it is not radical realism but its critics who may have a problematic relationship with the status quo. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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