Severity and Trustworthy Evidence: Foundational Problems versus Misuses of Frequentist Testing.
For model-based frequentist statistics, based on a parametric statistical model , the trustworthiness of the ensuing evidence depends crucially on (i) the validity of the probabilistic assumptions comprising , (ii) the optimality of the inference procedures employed, and (iii) the adequateness of th...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 89; no. 2; pp. 378 - 398 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Apr2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159632402&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159632402 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2022 vid: 89 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 159632402 10.1017/psa.2021.23 ppf: 378 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 635KB tig: atl: Severity and Trustworthy Evidence: Foundational Problems versus Misuses of Frequentist Testing. aug: au: Spanos, Aris affil: Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA su: Trust Frequentist statistics Statistical models Parametric modeling Sample size (Statistics) sug: subj: Trust Frequentist statistics Statistical models Parametric modeling Sample size (Statistics) ab: For model-based frequentist statistics, based on a parametric statistical model , the trustworthiness of the ensuing evidence depends crucially on (i) the validity of the probabilistic assumptions comprising , (ii) the optimality of the inference procedures employed, and (iii) the adequateness of the sample size (n) to learn from data by securing (i)–(ii). It is argued that the criticism of the postdata severity evaluation of testing results based on a small n by Rochefort-Maranda (2020) is meritless because it conflates [a] misuses of testing with [b] genuine foundational problems. Interrogating this criticism reveals several misconceptions about trustworthy evidence and estimation-based effect sizes, which are uncritically embraced by the replication crisis literature. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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