Perspectival Instruments.
Despite its potential implications for the objectivity of scientific knowledge, the claim that "scientific instruments are perspectival" has received little critical attention. I show that this claim is best understood as highlighting the dependence of instruments on different perspectives. When clo...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 89; no. 3; pp. 521 - 542 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jul2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159632410&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159632410 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2022 vid: 89 iid: 3 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 159632410 10.1017/psa.2021.32 ppf: 521 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 212KB tig: atl: Perspectival Instruments. aug: au: Creţu, Ana-Maria affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK su: Scientific apparatus & instruments Relativity Objectivity Scientific knowledge sug: subj: Scientific apparatus & instruments Relativity Objectivity Scientific knowledge ab: Despite its potential implications for the objectivity of scientific knowledge, the claim that "scientific instruments are perspectival" has received little critical attention. I show that this claim is best understood as highlighting the dependence of instruments on different perspectives. When closely analyzed, instead of constituting a novel epistemic challenge, this dependence can be exploited to mount novel strategies for resolving two old epistemic problems: conceptual relativism and theory-ladeness. The novel content of this article consists in articulating and developing these strategies by introducing two fine-grained notions of perspectives as the key units of analysis: "broad perspectives" and "narrow perspectives." pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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