Optimal Taxation of Income‐Generating Choice.
Discrete location, occupation, skill, and hours choices of workers underpin their incomes. This paper analyzes the optimal taxation of discrete income‐generating choice. It derives optimal tax equations and Pareto test inequalities for mixed logit choice environments that can accommodate discrete an...
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 90; no. 5; pp. 2397 - 2437 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=159688481&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 159688481 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00129682 ECN jtl: Econometrica issn: 00129682 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2022 vid: 90 iid: 5 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 159688481 10.3982/ECTA18542 ppf: 2397 ppct: 40 formats: tig: atl: Optimal Taxation of Income‐Generating Choice. aug: au: Ales, Laurence Sleet, Christopher affil: Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University Department of Economics, University of Rochester su: Income tax Income Optimal taxation Structural optimization Logistic regression analysis sug: subj: Income tax Income Optimal taxation Structural optimization Logistic regression analysis keyword: discrete choice Mixed logit optimal taxation discrete choice Mixed logit optimal taxation ab: Discrete location, occupation, skill, and hours choices of workers underpin their incomes. This paper analyzes the optimal taxation of discrete income‐generating choice. It derives optimal tax equations and Pareto test inequalities for mixed logit choice environments that can accommodate discrete and unstructured choice sets, rich preference heterogeneity, and complex aggregate cross‐substitution patterns between choices. These equations explicitly connect optimal taxes to societal redistributive goals and private substitution behavior, with the latter encoded as a substitution matrix that describes cross‐sensitivities of choice distributions to tax‐induced utility variation. In repeated mixed logit settings, the substitution matrix is exactly the Markov matrix of shock‐induced agent transitions across choices. We describe implications of this equivalence for evaluation of prevailing tax designs and the structural estimation of optimal policy mixed logit models. We apply our results to two salient examples: spatial taxation and taxation of couples. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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