Representationalist physicalism.

In this paper, I discuss a view proposed by Carl Hempel in his paper Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets, published in 1969. Here, Hempel suggested that questions regarding the identification of mental states with physiological states, the relation between sociological phenomena and individ...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 88; no. 5; pp. 887 - 899
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Oct2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159738065&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 159738065
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00405825
        HL0
      jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy
      issn: 00405825
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Oct2022
      vid: 88
      iid: 5
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        159738065
        10.1111/theo.12410
      ppf: 887
      ppct: 12
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 172KB
      tig:
        atl: Representationalist physicalism.
      aug:
      su:
        Hempel, Carl G. (Carl Gustav), 1905-1997
        Linguistics
        Philosophy
        Ethics
        Mathematics
      sug:
        subj:
          Hempel, Carl G. (Carl Gustav), 1905-1997
          Linguistics
          Philosophy
          Ethics
          Mathematics
      ab: In this paper, I discuss a view proposed by Carl Hempel in his paper Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets, published in 1969. Here, Hempel suggested that questions regarding the identification of mental states with physiological states, the relation between sociological phenomena and individual behavioral states, and between biological and physicochemical states should be given what he calls a 'linguistic' interpretation. His main point is that whether or not an object is physical or biological depends on how it is, or can be, described. In this paper, I wish to, firstly, explicate Hempel's suggestion, and, secondly, explore one argument in favor of Hempel's account. I will suggest that there is at least one use of the term 'physical' in philosophical discourse (and, for that matter, of related terms such as 'biological', 'mental', 'natural' etc.) that should be cashed out in linguistic or representational terms.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy
      holder: Wiley-Blackwell
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2022
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N