Generic inferential rules for slurs and contrasting senses.
This article offers a new perspective on the relationship between slurring terms and their neutral counterparts with an inferentialist view of slurs. I argue that slurs and their counterparts are coextensional with contrasting senses. Crucially, the proposed inferentialist view overcomes the combina...
| Publicado en: | Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 88; no. 5; pp. 1037 - 1053 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159738072&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159738072 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00405825 HL0 jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy issn: 00405825 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2022 vid: 88 iid: 5 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 159738072 10.1111/theo.12428 ppf: 1037 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 205KB tig: atl: Generic inferential rules for slurs and contrasting senses. aug: su: Substitution (Logic) Discriminatory language Philosophy Truth Ontology sug: subj: Substitution (Logic) Discriminatory language Philosophy Truth Ontology keyword: inferential rules Kaplanian inferences slurs substitutions ab: This article offers a new perspective on the relationship between slurring terms and their neutral counterparts with an inferentialist view of slurs. I argue that slurs and their counterparts are coextensional with contrasting senses. Crucially, the proposed inferentialist view overcomes the combination of two challenges: Kaplanian inferences and the substitution argument. The previous views cannot account for both of them. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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