Can we Bridge AI's responsibility gap at Will?
Artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly executes tasks that previously only humans could do, such as drive a car, fight in war, or perform a medical operation. However, as the very best AI systems tend to be the least controllable and the least transparent, some scholars argued that humans can no...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 25; no. 4; pp. 575 - 594 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159794266&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159794266 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2022 vid: 25 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 159794266 10.1007/s10677-022-10313-9 ppf: 575 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 701KB tig: atl: Can we Bridge AI's responsibility gap at Will? aug: au: Kiener, Maximilian affil: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, University College, High Street, OX1 4BH, Oxford, UK su: Artificial intelligence Legal liability Responsibility Speech acts (Linguistics) Normative theory (Communication) sug: subj: Artificial intelligence Legal liability Responsibility Speech acts (Linguistics) Normative theory (Communication) keyword: Answerability Artificial Intelligence Liability Normative Powers Responsibility gap ab: Artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly executes tasks that previously only humans could do, such as drive a car, fight in war, or perform a medical operation. However, as the very best AI systems tend to be the least controllable and the least transparent, some scholars argued that humans can no longer be morally responsible for some of the AI-caused outcomes, which would then result in a responsibility gap. In this paper, I assume, for the sake of argument, that at least some of the most sophisticated AI systems do indeed create responsibility gaps, and I ask whether we can bridge these gaps at will, viz. whether certain people could take responsibility for AI-caused harm simply by performing a certain speech act, just as people can give permission for something simply by performing the act of consent. So understood, taking responsibility would be a genuine normative power. I first discuss and reject the view of Champagne and Tonkens, who advocate a view of taking liability. According to this view, a military commander can and must, ahead of time, accept liability to blame and punishment for any harm caused by autonomous weapon systems under her command. I then defend my own proposal of taking answerability, viz. the view that people can makes themselves morally answerable for the harm caused by AI systems, not only ahead of time but also when harm has already been caused. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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