The Metarepresentational Role of Mathematics in Scientific Explanations.
Several philosophers have argued that to capture the generality of certain scientific explanations, we must count mathematical facts among their explanantia. I argue that we can better understand these explanations by adopting a more nuanced stance toward mathematical representations , recognizing t...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 742 - 761 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159949333&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159949333 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2022 vid: 89 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 159949333 10.1017/psa.2021.46 ppf: 742 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 184KB tig: atl: The Metarepresentational Role of Mathematics in Scientific Explanations. aug: au: McCullough-Benner, Colin affil: School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK su: Explanation Mathematics sug: subj: Explanation Mathematics ab: Several philosophers have argued that to capture the generality of certain scientific explanations, we must count mathematical facts among their explanantia. I argue that we can better understand these explanations by adopting a more nuanced stance toward mathematical representations , recognizing the role of mathematical representation schemata in representing highly abstract features of physical systems. It is by picking out these abstract but nonmathematical features that explanations appealing to mathematics achieve a high degree of generality. The result is a rich conception of the role of mathematics in scientific explanations that does not require us to treat mathematical facts as explanantia. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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