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Fair Infinite Lotteries, Qualitative Probability, and Regularity.

A number of philosophers have thought that fair lotteries over countably infinite sets of outcomes are conceptually incoherent by virtue of violating countable additivity. In this article, I show that a qualitative analogue of this argument generalizes to an argument against the conceptual coherence...

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Published in:Philosophy of Science Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 824 - 845
Main Author: DiBella, Nicholas
Format: Article
Published: Cambridge University Press Oct2022
Subjects:
Lotteries
Probability theory
Philosophers
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Fair Infinite Lotteries, Qualitative Probability, and Regularity.
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        au: DiBella, Nicholas
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara 06800, Turkey
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        Lotteries
        Probability theory
        Philosophers
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          Lotteries
          Probability theory
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      ab: A number of philosophers have thought that fair lotteries over countably infinite sets of outcomes are conceptually incoherent by virtue of violating countable additivity. In this article, I show that a qualitative analogue of this argument generalizes to an argument against the conceptual coherence of a much wider class of fair infinite lotteries—including continuous uniform distributions. I argue that this result suggests that fair lotteries over countably infinite sets of outcomes are no more conceptually problematic than continuous uniform distributions. Along the way, I provide a novel argument for a weak qualitative, epistemic version of regularity.
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    language: English
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