Setting the Demons Loose: Computational Irreducibility Does Not Guarantee Unpredictability or Emergence.

A phenomenon resulting from a computationally irreducible (or computationally incompressible) process is supposedly unpredictable except via simulation. This notion of unpredictability has been deployed to formulate recent accounts of computational emergence. Via a technical analysis, I show that co...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 761 - 784
Autor principal: Tabatabaei Ghomi, Hamed
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Oct2022
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Setting the Demons Loose: Computational Irreducibility Does Not Guarantee Unpredictability or Emergence.
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        au: Tabatabaei Ghomi, Hamed
        affil: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
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      ab: A phenomenon resulting from a computationally irreducible (or computationally incompressible) process is supposedly unpredictable except via simulation. This notion of unpredictability has been deployed to formulate recent accounts of computational emergence. Via a technical analysis, I show that computational irreducibility can establish the impossibility of prediction only with respect to maximum standards of precision. By articulating the graded nature of prediction, I show that unpredictability to maximum standards is not equivalent to being unpredictable in general. I conclude that computational irreducibility fails to fulfill its assigned philosophical roles in theories of computational emergence.
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