Why Mental Disorders are not Like Software Bugs.

According to the Argument for Autonomous Mental Disorder (AAMD), mental disorder can occur in the absence of brain disorder, just as software problems can occur in the absence of hardware problems in a computer. This article argues that the AAMD is unsound. I begin by introducing the "natural dysfun...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 661 - 683
Autor principal: Fagerberg, Harriet
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Oct2022
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Why Mental Disorders are not Like Software Bugs.
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        au: Fagerberg, Harriet
        affil:
          Department of Philosophy, King's College London, London, UK
          Institut für Philosophie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Deutschland
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        Mental illness
        Computers
        Computer software
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        subj:
          Mental illness
          Computers
          Computer software
      ab: According to the Argument for Autonomous Mental Disorder (AAMD), mental disorder can occur in the absence of brain disorder, just as software problems can occur in the absence of hardware problems in a computer. This article argues that the AAMD is unsound. I begin by introducing the "natural dysfunction analysis" of disorder, before outlining the AAMD. I then analyze the necessary conditions for realizer autonomous dysfunction. Building on this, I show that software functions disassociate from hardware functions in a way that mental functions do not disassociate from brain functions. It follows that mental disorders are brain disorders necessarily.
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