Some problems with particularism.
Particularists maintain that conspiracy theories are to be assessed individually, while generalists hold that conspiracy theories may be assessed as a class. This paper seeks to clarify the nature and importance of the debate between particularism and generalism, while offering an argument for a ver...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 6; pp. 1 - 26 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159968212&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159968212 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2022 vid: 200 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 159968212 10.1007/s11229-022-03948-9 ppf: 1 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 338KB tig: atl: Some problems with particularism. aug: au: Harris, Keith Raymond affil: Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany sug: keyword: Applied epistemology Consensus Conspiracy theories Epistemic authority Pessimistic induction ab: Particularists maintain that conspiracy theories are to be assessed individually, while generalists hold that conspiracy theories may be assessed as a class. This paper seeks to clarify the nature and importance of the debate between particularism and generalism, while offering an argument for a version of generalism. I begin by considering three approaches to the definition of conspiracy theory, and offer reason to prefer an approach that defines conspiracy theories in opposition to the claims of epistemic authorities. I argue that particularists rely on an untenably broad definition of conspiracy theory. Then, I argue that particularism and its counterpart are best understood as constellations of theses, rather than a pair of incompatible theses. While some particularist theses are highly plausible, I argue that one important particularist thesis is false. The argument for this conclusion draws on the history of false conspiracy theories. I then defend this conclusion against a pair of potential objections. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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