The Subject-Dependency of Perceptual Objects.
Entities that are, in ordinary perceptual situations, veridically presented as objects can be called 'perceptual objects'. In the philosophical literature, one can find various approaches to the crucial features that distinguish the class of perceptual objects. While these positions differ in many r...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 6; pp. 2827 - 2843 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=160089238&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 160089238 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2022 vid: 87 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 160089238 10.1007/s10670-020-00328-y ppf: 2827 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 577KB tig: atl: The Subject-Dependency of Perceptual Objects. aug: au: Skrzypulec, Błażej affil: Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044, Kraków, Poland su: Philosophical literature Definitions sug: subj: Philosophical literature Definitions ab: Entities that are, in ordinary perceptual situations, veridically presented as objects can be called 'perceptual objects'. In the philosophical literature, one can find various approaches to the crucial features that distinguish the class of perceptual objects. While these positions differ in many respects, they share an important general feature: they all characterize perceptual objects as largely subject-independent. More specifically, they do not attribute a significant constitutive role to the perceptual relation connecting a fragment of the environment with a perceiving subject. Fragments of the environment are perceptual objects no matter whether they stand in a perceptual relation to any subject, mainly by virtue of having a certain physical structure. I question this common assumption, relying on Green's (2019) definition of perceptual objects, arguing that a proper theory of perceptual objects should accommodate the constitutive role of perceptual relations. This is because there exist fragments of the environment that are perceptual objects only when they stand in a perceptual relation to a subject. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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