Respecting evidence: belief functions not imprecise probabilities.
The received model of degrees of belief represents them as probabilities. Over the last half century, many philosophers have been convinced that this model fails because it cannot cmake room for the idea that an agent’s degrees of belief should respect the available evidence. In its place they have...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 6; pp. 1 - 29 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=160156012&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 160156012 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2022 vid: 200 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 160156012 10.1007/s11229-022-03937-y ppf: 1 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 667KB tig: atl: Respecting evidence: belief functions not imprecise probabilities. aug: au: Smith, Nicholas J. J. affil: Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Main Quadrangle A14, 2006, Sydney, NSW, Australia sug: keyword: Belief inertia Degree of belief Dempster–Shafer belief function Dilation Evidence Imprecise probability Probability ab: The received model of degrees of belief represents them as probabilities. Over the last half century, many philosophers have been convinced that this model fails because it cannot cmake room for the idea that an agent’s degrees of belief should respect the available evidence. In its place they have advocated a model that represents degrees of belief using imprecise probabilities (sets of probability functions). This paper presents a model of degrees of belief based on Dempster–Shafer belief functions and then presents arguments for belief functions over imprecise probabilities as a model of evidence-respecting degrees of belief. The arguments cover three kinds of issue: theoretical virtues (simplicity, interpretability and flexibility); motivations; and problem cases (dilation and belief inertia). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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