Hobbes and the Indirect Workings of Political Consent.

This paper brings to light an unexplored aspect of Hobbes's argument that political authority rests upon subjects' consent. Consent enacts a transfer of subjects' right of nature to the sovereign, yet she already possesses a natural right to everything. What moral difference, then, does this make to...

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Publicado en:Hobbes Studies Vol. 35; no. 2; pp. 155 - 176
Autor principal: Ramelet, Laetitia
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Brill Academic Publishers 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Hobbes and the Indirect Workings of Political Consent.
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        au: Ramelet, Laetitia
        affil: Faculty of Law, Criminal Justice and Public Administration, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
      su:
        Natural law
        Peace
        Possibility
      sug:
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          Natural law
          Peace
          Possibility
      keyword:
        consent
        natural law
        political authority
        punishment
        right transfer
      ab: This paper brings to light an unexplored aspect of Hobbes's argument that political authority rests upon subjects' consent. Consent enacts a transfer of subjects' right of nature to the sovereign, yet she already possesses a natural right to everything. What moral difference, then, does this make to her possession of power, and how? In my reading, the difference lies in the rise of new obligations befalling the sovereign by means of an indirect mechanism: That many individuals, hoping for safety, transfer their right of nature to the sovereign triggers an obligation for her to accept the role of a ruler and perform the duties attached to it, for the sake of the peace enjoined by the laws of nature. This reading should also confirm the possibility of a consensual foundation for the Hobbesian right to punish and shed new light on Hobbes's notion of tacit consent.
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