A Negishi Approach to Recursive Contracts.
In this paper, we argue that a large class of recursive contracts can be studied by means of the conventional Negishi method. A planner is responsible for prescribing current actions along with a distribution of future utility values to all agents, so as to maximize their weighted sum of utilities....
| Publicado en: | Econometrica Vol. 90; no. 6; pp. 2821 - 2856 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=160352054&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 160352054 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00129682 ECN jtl: Econometrica issn: 00129682 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2022 vid: 90 iid: 6 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 160352054 10.3982/ECTA18310 ppf: 2821 ppct: 35 formats: tig: atl: A Negishi Approach to Recursive Contracts. aug: au: Bloise, Gaetano Siconolfi, Paolo affil: Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome II Graduate School of Business, Columbia University su: Contracts Dynamic programming sug: subj: Contracts Dynamic programming keyword: dynamic programming efficiency Negishi method optimal policy Recursive contracts dynamic programming efficiency Negishi method optimal policy Recursive contracts ab: In this paper, we argue that a large class of recursive contracts can be studied by means of the conventional Negishi method. A planner is responsible for prescribing current actions along with a distribution of future utility values to all agents, so as to maximize their weighted sum of utilities. Under convexity, the method yields the exact efficient frontier. Otherwise, the implementation requires contracts be contingent on publicly observable random signals uncorrelated to fundamentals. We also provide operational first‐order conditions for the characterization of efficient contracts. Finally, we compare extensively our approach with the dual method established in the literature. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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