Competition and health‐care spending: Theory and application to Certificate of Need laws.

Hospitals and other health‐care providers in 34 states must obtain a Certificate of Need (CON) from a state board before opening or expanding, leading to reduced competition. We develop a theoretical model of how market concentration affects health‐care spending. Our theoretical model shows that inc...

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Publicado en:Contemporary Economic Policy Vol. 41; no. 1; pp. 128 - 146
Autores principales: Bailey, James, Hamami, Tom
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jan2023
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Competition and health‐care spending: Theory and application to Certificate of Need laws.
      aug:
        au:
          Bailey, James
          Hamami, Tom
        affil: Department of Economics, Providence College, Providence Rhode Island, , USA
      su: Industrial concentration
      sug:
        subj: Industrial concentration
      keyword:
        Certificate of Need
        competition
        health‐care spending
        medical expenditure panel survey
        Certificate of Need
        competition
        health‐care spending
        medical expenditure panel survey
      ab: Hospitals and other health‐care providers in 34 states must obtain a Certificate of Need (CON) from a state board before opening or expanding, leading to reduced competition. We develop a theoretical model of how market concentration affects health‐care spending. Our theoretical model shows that increases in concentration, such as those brought about by CON, can either increase or decrease spending. Our model predicts that CON is more likely to increase spending in markets in which costs are low and patients are sicker. We test our model using spending data from the Household Component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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