Infini-Rien: Ist Pascals Wettargument formallogisch ungültig?
In the Infini-Rien fragment of his Pensées, Blaise Pascal develops an argument for the rationality of faith in God, which posthumously became known as Pascal's Wager and at the same time represents a cornerstone of modern probability theory. While this betting argument has been the subject of much p...
| Publicado en: | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Vol. 104; no. 4; pp. 759 - 783 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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De Gruyter
Dec2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=160508050&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 160508050 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00039101 B7X jtl: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie issn: 00039101 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2022 vid: 104 iid: 4 pid: 1734 pub: De Gruyter artinfo: ui: 160508050 10.1515/agph-2020-0104 ppf: 759 ppct: 24 formats: tig: atl: Infini-Rien: Ist Pascals Wettargument formallogisch ungültig? aug: au: Hoffmann, Christian affil: Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques, 13 rue du Four, 75006 Paris, FR su: Pascal, Blaise, 1623-1662 Probability theory Argument Computer hacking sug: subj: Pascal, Blaise, 1623-1662 Probability theory Argument Computer hacking ab: In the Infini-Rien fragment of his Pensées, Blaise Pascal develops an argument for the rationality of faith in God, which posthumously became known as Pascal's Wager and at the same time represents a cornerstone of modern probability theory. While this betting argument has been the subject of much philosophical investigation, the contribution of this paper lies in the following: On the one hand, the bet is reconstructed in its basic features as well as its structure with the help of modern decision and probability theory tools. Thus, it is shown that Pascal's betting argument, in distinction to Hacking 1972 for instance, has the form of an a fortiori argument. On the other hand, as far as objections to Pascal's argument are concerned, it is true that the premises have often been called into doubt, more or less convincingly. On the other hand, this article is dedicated to the question, often emphatically – especially in Hacking 1972 – and perhaps carelessly affirmed in Pascal research, whether Pascal's premises imply his conclusion at all. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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