On the relation between corruption and market competition.
We construct a model where bureaucrats are corruptible, in the sense that they may accept bribes in order to mislead the authorities on the actual circumstances of firms that do not comply with a government regulation. We show that corruption increases the number of competing firms. We also show tha...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 61; no. 1; pp. 99 - 122 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=160509318&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 160509318 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2023 vid: 61 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 160509318 10.1111/ecin.13113 ppf: 99 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: On the relation between corruption and market competition. aug: au: Varvarigos, Dimitrios Stathopoulou, Eleni affil: School of Business, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK Department of Economics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK su: Corruption Bribery Government regulation Civil service sug: subj: Corruption Bribery Government regulation Civil service Other General Government Support keyword: competition corruption market entry competition corruption market entry ab: We construct a model where bureaucrats are corruptible, in the sense that they may accept bribes in order to mislead the authorities on the actual circumstances of firms that do not comply with a government regulation. We show that corruption increases the number of competing firms. We also show that increased competition (i) increases the likelihood that corruptible bureaucrats will actually transgress, and (ii) increases the bribe that corrupt bureaucrats will demand from each firm. These results are consistent with existing evidence showing a positive relation between competition and corruption, and that this causal relation operates in both directions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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