Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism.
Multiple realizability says that the same kind of mental states may be manifested by systems with very different physical constitutions. Putnam (1967) supposed it to be “overwhelmingly probable” that there exist psychological properties with different physical realizations in different creatures. Bu...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 6; pp. 1 - 32 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=160549249&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 160549249 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2022 vid: 200 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 160549249 10.1007/s11229-022-03524-1 ppf: 1 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism. aug: au: Cao, Rosa affil: Dept of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA sug: keyword: AI Artificial intelligence Behaviorism Biology Brain Consciousness Constraints Embodiment Emergence Explanation Functionalism Identity theory Metabolism Mind Neurons Neuroscience Reduction Reductionism Representation ab: Multiple realizability says that the same kind of mental states may be manifested by systems with very different physical constitutions. Putnam (1967) supposed it to be “overwhelmingly probable” that there exist psychological properties with different physical realizations in different creatures. But because function constrains possible physical realizers, this empirical bet is far less favorable than it might initially have seemed, especially when we take on board the richer picture of neural and brain function that neuroscience has been uncovering over the past forty years, in which all sorts of brain activities play crucial roles beyond all-or-nothing electrical signaling. Because of its evolutionary history, the brain’s metabolic and informational processes are inextricably intertwined. The resulting complex integrated functions impose more constraints on possible realizers than the clean, single-purpose functions usually cited as examples in discussions of multiple realizability—with ramifications for the functionalist and computationalist foundations of cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of mind. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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