Naïve realism and supersaturated hue.

Naïve realists have yet to successfully discharge the problem of supersaturated hue, afterimage-experiences as of hued surfaces that are beyond-maximally saturated. The experiences are a problem for the view because supersaturation, qua property of external objects, is an impossible color property....

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 200; no. 6; pp. 1 - 32
Autor principal: Sharp, William A.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2022
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Naïve realism and supersaturated hue.
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        affil: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beersheba, Israel
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      keyword:
        color experience
        naive realism
        novel colors
        perception
      ab: Naïve realists have yet to successfully discharge the problem of supersaturated hue, afterimage-experiences as of hued surfaces that are beyond-maximally saturated. The experiences are a problem for the view because supersaturation, qua property of external objects, is an impossible color property. Accordingly, the experiences cannot be handled in terms of their indiscriminability from perceptions of such surfaces, in the manner of Martin (2004). Nor can they be handled in terms of seen surfaces looking supersaturated, in the manner of Kalderon (2011). This ramifies for every naïve realist view which grounds perceptual phenomenology in relation to perceptions, or to the qualities perceptions reveal.
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