Profiling, Neutrality, and Social Equality.
I argue that traditional views on which beliefs are subject only to purely epistemic assessment can reject demographic profiling, even when based on seemingly robust evidence. This is because the moral failures involved in demographic profiling can be located in the decision not to suspend judgment,...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 100; no. 4; pp. 808 - 825 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=160588591&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 160588591 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2022 vid: 100 iid: 4 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 160588591 10.1080/00048402.2021.1926522 ppf: 808 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Profiling, Neutrality, and Social Equality. aug: au: Ross, Lewis affil: London School of Economics and Political Science su: Equality Epistemics Demography Philosophy of science Fallibility sug: subj: Equality Epistemics Demography Philosophy of science Fallibility keyword: ethics of belief moral encroachment neutrality profiling social egalitarianism statistical evidence suspended judgment ab: I argue that traditional views on which beliefs are subject only to purely epistemic assessment can reject demographic profiling, even when based on seemingly robust evidence. This is because the moral failures involved in demographic profiling can be located in the decision not to suspend judgment, rather than supposing that beliefs themselves are a locus of moral evaluation. A key moral reason to suspend judgment when faced with adverse demographic evidence is to promote social equality—this explains why positive profiling is dubious, along with more familiar cases of negative profiling, and why profiling is suspect even when no particular action is at stake. My suspension-based view, while compatible with revisionary normative positions, does not presuppose them. Philosophers of all stripes can reject demographic profiling both in thought and deed. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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