Swampman, teleosemantics and kind essences.
One powerful and influential approach to mental representation analyses representation in terms of biological functions, and biological functions in terms of histories of natural selection. This “teleosemantic” package, however, faces a familiar challenge. Surely representation depends only on the p...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 6; pp. 1 - 20 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=160639292&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 160639292 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2022 vid: 200 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 160639292 10.1007/s11229-022-03966-7 ppf: 1 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 269KB tig: atl: Swampman, teleosemantics and kind essences. aug: au: Papineau, David affil: Department of Philosophy, King's College London, WC2R 2LS, Strand, London, UK sug: keyword: Essences Natural kinds Representation Swampman Teleosemantics ab: One powerful and influential approach to mental representation analyses representation in terms of biological functions, and biological functions in terms of histories of natural selection. This “teleosemantic” package, however, faces a familiar challenge. Surely representation depends only on the present-day structures of cognitive systems, and not on their historical provenance. “Swampman” drives the point home. Suppose a bolt of lightning creates an intrinsic duplicate of a human being in a steamy tropic swamp; will not this creature be representing its surroundings, despite its lack of any selectional history? In this paper I shall answer this challenge by showing how a proper appreciation of the structure of natural kinds in general, and of mental representation in particular, implies that selectional histories are indeed built into the nature of mental representation. In particular, I shall address a recent argument by Peter Schulte against this general line of argument. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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