Implementing optimal outcomes through sequential auctions.
We study sequential auctions as optimal mechanisms for selling multiple heterogeneous items to unit‐demand buyers. We find that as long as the items can be ordered in decreasing variation of the buyers' values, any combination of static standard auctions in this sequence achieves full efficiency and...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 53; no. 4; pp. 703 - 733 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2022
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=160766010&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 160766010 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2022 vid: 53 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 160766010 10.1111/1756-2171.12423 ppf: 703 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 321KB tig: atl: Implementing optimal outcomes through sequential auctions. aug: au: Shi, Fanqi Xing, Yiqing affil: Peking University Johns Hopkins University su: Prices Auctions sug: subj: Prices Auctions keyword: disclosure optimal mechanism reserve price sequential auction sponsored search auction disclosure optimal mechanism reserve price sequential auction sponsored search auction ab: We study sequential auctions as optimal mechanisms for selling multiple heterogeneous items to unit‐demand buyers. We find that as long as the items can be ordered in decreasing variation of the buyers' values, any combination of static standard auctions in this sequence achieves full efficiency and the constrained optimal revenue, subject to (BIC), (IIR), and the all‐sold constraint. In addition, with increasing threshold types and optimal static reserve prices, any l‐th price auctions in the same sequence can achieve the optimal revenue subject to (BIC) and (IIR). Our results have implications for practical auction design, such as sponsored search auctions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|