Mergers and market power: evidence from rivals' responses in European markets.
We analyze the effects of M&A on the markups of non‐merging rival firms across a broad set of industries. We exploit expert market definitions from the European Commission's merger decisions to identify relevant competitors in narrowly defined product markets and estimate markups as a measure of mar...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 53; no. 4; pp. 678 - 703 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=160766014&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 160766014 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2022 vid: 53 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 160766014 10.1111/1756-2171.12427 ppf: 678 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 652KB tig: atl: Mergers and market power: evidence from rivals' responses in European markets. aug: au: Stiebale, Joel Szücs, Florian affil: DICE, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien su: European Commission Mergers & acquisitions Market power sug: subj: European Commission Mergers & acquisitions Market power ab: We analyze the effects of M&A on the markups of non‐merging rival firms across a broad set of industries. We exploit expert market definitions from the European Commission's merger decisions to identify relevant competitors in narrowly defined product markets and estimate markups as a measure of market power. Our results indicate that rivals increase their markups after mergers. Consistent with increases in market power, the effects are particularly pronounced when pre‐merger concentration is high, when competitors are few, and when relevant markets are national. Merger rivals also reduce their employment, sales, and investment, whereas their profits increase. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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