Why group mental states are not exhaustively determined by member states.

To speak of the "constitution" of the buildings' state of displaying the Barnes Collection is even a bit stranger than to speak of the constitution of the state of the one building displaying I Le Bonheur de Vivre i . Yet at any given time, certain bits of paint and canvas are part of the constituti...

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Published in:Philosophical Issues Vol. 32; no. 1; pp. 417 - 434
Main Author: Epstein, Brian
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Oct2022
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Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Why group mental states are not exhaustively determined by member states.
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        au: Epstein, Brian
        affil: Tufts University, Medford MA, , USA
      su:
        Automatic meteorological stations
        Externalism (Philosophy of mind)
        Cognition
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          Automatic meteorological stations
          Externalism (Philosophy of mind)
          Cognition
      ab: To speak of the "constitution" of the buildings' state of displaying the Barnes Collection is even a bit stranger than to speak of the constitution of the state of the one building displaying I Le Bonheur de Vivre i . Yet at any given time, certain bits of paint and canvas are part of the constitution of I Le Bonheur de Vivre i .[9] Matisse is not and never was part of the constitution of I Le Bonheur de Vivre i . (Theiner, [40], p. 197) In these two articles, neither Tollefsen nor Theiner addresses hybrids. That is, scientific knowledge at I t i fails to be exhaustively determined by knowledge states of individuals at I t i (i.e., by synchronic knowledge states). Still, that state is in part I ontologically determined i by Matisse, who is not part of the constitution of the Barnes Foundation Building (or I a fortiori i , of the constitution of I Le Bonheur de Vivre i ).
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