Distributive justice, social cooperation, and the basis of equality.
This paper considers the view that the basis of equality is the range property of being a moral person. This view, suggested by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice (1971), is commonly dismissed in the literature. By defending the view against the criticism levelled against it, I aim to show that t...
| Publicado en: | Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 88; no. 6; pp. 1180 - 1196 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=160784947&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 160784947 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00405825 HL0 jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy issn: 00405825 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2022 vid: 88 iid: 6 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 160784947 10.1111/theo.12433 ppf: 1180 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 223KB tig: atl: Distributive justice, social cooperation, and the basis of equality. aug: au: Andersson, Emil affil: Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Montreal, Canada Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden The Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden su: Distributive justice Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of Justice, A (Book : Rawls) Contractarianism (Ethics) Political philosophy sug: subj: Distributive justice Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of Justice, A (Book : Rawls) Contractarianism (Ethics) Political philosophy keyword: basis of equality Contractualism distributive justice John Rawls ab: This paper considers the view that the basis of equality is the range property of being a moral person. This view, suggested by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice (1971), is commonly dismissed in the literature. By defending the view against the criticism levelled against it, I aim to show that this dismissal has been too quick. The critics have generally failed to fully appreciate the fact that Rawls's account is restricted to the domain of distributive justice. On Rawls's view distributive justice is a matter of the fair terms of cooperation among the participants of a system of social cooperation. I argue that this understanding of distributive justice can provide a compelling rationale for considering moral personality as the basis of equality for this domain of morality. That moral persons are indeed equal is further supported by an intuitive argument concerning the irrelevance of morally arbitrary factors, giving us reasons to believe that varying capacities among moral persons does not result in an unequal moral status. The dismissal of Rawls's account of equality has thus been premature, and it remains an important view to consider. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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