Moral Self-Realization in Kant and Spinoza.
Spinoza and Kant are considered to be polar opposites with respect to ethics. The radical difference between them is supposed to consist in Spinoza's ethical egoism, or interest-based Strebensethik, and Kant's duty-cantered, deontological Sollensethik. I challenge this opposition and argue that both...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 102; pp. 22 - 36 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Vilnius University
2022
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Spinoza and Kant are considered to be polar opposites with respect to ethics. The radical difference between them is supposed to consist in Spinoza's ethical egoism, or interest-based Strebensethik, and Kant's duty-cantered, deontological Sollensethik. I challenge this opposition and argue that both in Kant and Spinoza we deal with a notion of the self's realization that is "interest"-based and therefore does not involve self-sacrifice. I show, on the one hand, that the streben in Spinoza's Strebensethik consists in realising one's essentially human interest, which resides in ethical-rational action, and, on the other hand, that sollen in Kant's Sollensethik is in fact a streben of the Kantian "proper self" (eigentliches Selbst) after the realization of its ethical-rational interest. Spinoza ir Kantas etikos požiūriu laikomi visiškomis priešingybėmis. Manoma, kad esminis skirtumas tarp jų yra etinis Spinozos egoizmas, arba interesais pagrįstas Strebensethik, ir Kanto pagrįstas pareigomis, deontologinis Sollensethik. Straipsnyje ši opozicija kvestionuojama. Teigiama, kad tiek Kanto, tiek ir Spinozos filosofijoje susiduriame su savirealizacijos samprata, kuri yra pagrįsta „interesais" ir todėl nėra susijusi su pasiaukojimu. Viena vertus, parodoma, kad streben Spinozos Strebensethik iš esmės kreipia į žmogiškojo intereso, glūdinčio etiniame-racionaliame veiksme, įgyvendinimą; antra vertus, atskleidžiama, kad sollen Kanto Sollensethik iš tikrųjų yra kantiškojo „tikrojo aš" (eigentliches Selbst) streben, išliekantis po to, kai jau įgyvendintas savasis etinis-racionalus interesas. |
|---|