Toward a New Theory of Moderate Contingentism: Individuals just are Realized Essences.
In this paper, we propose a new actualist and contingentist modal metaphysics - fundamental essentialism - according to which individuals just are realized essences. Orthodox possible worlds semantics is incompatible with actualism and contingentism since Kripke models in which paradigmatic continge...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 102; pp. 36 - 50 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=160804484&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 160804484 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13921126 3D4C jtl: Problems / Problemos issn: 13921126 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2022 vid: 102 pid: 16037 pub: Vilnius University artinfo: ui: 160804484 10.15388/Problemos.2022.102.3 ppf: 36 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.8MB tig: atl: Toward a New Theory of Moderate Contingentism: Individuals just are Realized Essences. aug: au: Gricius, Pranciškus affil: Institute of Philosophy Vilnius University su: Essentialism (Philosophy) Metaphysics Semantics Argument sug: subj: Essentialism (Philosophy) Metaphysics Semantics Argument keyword: Actualism Contingentism Necessitism Possible Worlds Semantics Unexemplified Essences aktualizmas galimų pasaulių semantika kontingentizmas necesitizmas neinstancijuotos esmės ab: In this paper, we propose a new actualist and contingentist modal metaphysics - fundamental essentialism - according to which individuals just are realized essences. Orthodox possible worlds semantics is incompatible with actualism and contingentism since Kripke models in which paradigmatic contingentists propositions are true require possible worlds whose domain contain merely possible individuals. In light of this problem, Plantinga has developed modal metaphysics based on essences, but it has been claimed by Fine, Williamson, and others, that it cannot be upheld because of the problem of unexemplified essences. We answer the latter problem by claiming that individuals just are realized essences. Then, justifying our theory further we refute Williamson's deductive argument for necessitism. Afterward, we show in what sense fundamental essentialism is contingentist metaphysics. Straipsnyje siūloma nauja aktualistinė ir kontingentistinė modalinė metafizika - fundamentalusis esencializmas, - kuria remiantis individai ir yra realizuotos esmės. Standartinė galimų pasaulių semantika yra nesuderinama su aktualizmu ir kontingentizmu, kadangi Kripkės modeliuose, kuriuose paradigminiai kontingentistiniai teiginiai yra teisingi, esama galimų pasaulių, kurių domenai įtraukia vien galimus individus. Kaip atsaką į šią problemą Plantinga sukūrė esmėmis grįstą modalinę metafiziką, bet, Fine'o, Williamsono ir kitų autorių teigimu, dėl neinstancijuotų esmių problemos ši teorija negali būti teisinga. Straipsnyje atsakome į pastarąją problemą teigdami, kad individai ir yra realizuotos esmės. Siūlomą teoriją grindžiame paneigdami Williamsono deduktyvų samprotavimą, turintį pagrįsti necesitizmą. Tuomet parodome, kokia prasme fundamentalusis esencializmas yra kontingentistinė metafizika. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Problems / Problemos holder: Vilnius University dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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