Obligations of feeling.
Moral obligation, according to one influential conception, is distinct among other moral concepts in at least two respects. First, obligation is linked with demands. If I am obligated to you to do X, then you can demand that I do X. Second, obligation is linked with blame and the rest of our account...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 30; no. 4; pp. 1282 - 1298 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=160853510&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 160853510 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2022 vid: 30 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 160853510 10.1111/ejop.12727 ppf: 1282 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.4MB tig: atl: Obligations of feeling. aug: au: Attie‐Picker, Mario affil: Philosophy Department, Yale University, New Haven Connecticut, , USA su: Duty Emotions Conscientiousness Moral distance Social ethics sug: subj: Duty Emotions Conscientiousness Moral distance Social ethics ab: Moral obligation, according to one influential conception, is distinct among other moral concepts in at least two respects. First, obligation is linked with demands. If I am obligated to you to do X, then you can demand that I do X. Second, obligation is linked with blame and the rest of our accountability practices. If I am obligated to you to do X, failure to do so is blameworthy and you may hold me accountable for it. The puzzle is the following: when it comes to our attitudes, in particular to our emotional responses, these two components seem to come apart. We do not appear to demand that others feel a given emotion. And yet, we do blame others (and ourselves) for feeling them. The challenge I take on in this paper is to sort out the moral status of emotions given these facts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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