The Bare Past.
In this paper, I first introduce one of the most prominent objections against the Growing Block Theory of time (GBT), the so-called 'epistemic objection', according to which GBT provides no way of knowing that our time is the objective present and, therefore, leads at best to absolute skepticism abo...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 50; no. 5; pp. 2523 - 2551 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Nov2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=160893821&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 160893821 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2022 vid: 50 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 160893821 10.1007/s11406-022-00534-8 ppf: 2523 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 844KB tig: atl: The Bare Past. aug: au: Grandjean, Vincent affil: Faculty of Philosophy, Radcliffe Humanities, University of Oxford, Radcliffe Observatory Quarter, Woodstock Road, OX2 6GG, Oxford, UK su: Skepticism Agnosticism Essentialism (Philosophy) Substance (Philosophy) Epistemic logic sug: subj: Skepticism Agnosticism Essentialism (Philosophy) Substance (Philosophy) Epistemic logic keyword: Bare particulars Epistemic objection Essentialism Existence in the past Growing Block Theory Natural kind ab: In this paper, I first introduce one of the most prominent objections against the Growing Block Theory of time (GBT), the so-called 'epistemic objection', according to which GBT provides no way of knowing that our time is the objective present and, therefore, leads at best to absolute skepticism about our temporal location, at worst to the quasi-certainty that we are located in the objective past. Secondly, I express my dissatisfaction regarding the various traditional attempts to address this objection, especially Merricks (2006), Forrest (2004) and Correia and Rosenkranz (2018). Thirdly, I show that the passage of time leads to an anti-essentialist picture of natural kinds. Finally, I develop my own solution to the epistemic objection, based on the continued existence of bare particulars. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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