Renouncing the attempt versus perpetration distinction.
Legal and moral luck goes against the basic principle of criminal law that responsibility ascriptions are based on the mental state of the perpetrator, rather than merely the outcome of her action. If outcome should not play a decisive role in responsibility ascriptions, the attempt versus perpetrat...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 201; no. 1; pp. 1 - 30 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=161259499&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 161259499 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2023 vid: 201 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 161259499 10.1007/s11229-022-04000-6 ppf: 1 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 503KB tig: atl: Renouncing the attempt versus perpetration distinction. aug: au: Skoczeń, Izabela affil: Faculty of Law and Administration and Jagiellonian Centre for Law, Language and Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland sug: keyword: Attempt law Legal luck Moral luck Moral psychology Renunciation defense Responsibility ab: Legal and moral luck goes against the basic principle of criminal law that responsibility ascriptions are based on the mental state of the perpetrator, rather than merely the outcome of her action. If outcome should not play a decisive role in responsibility ascriptions, the attempt versus perpetration distinction becomes more difficult to justify. One potential justification is that we never know whether the attempter would not have resigned from pursuing her criminal intent even at the last moment. However, this paper argues that resigning from criminal intent and trying to stop the criminal outcome, which is called the renunciation defense, can be just as subject to outcome luck as the attempt versus perpetration distinction. And yet the availability of the renunciation defense in court is outcome dependent. I show with a series of experiments (N = 479) that outcome dependence for the renunciation defense is perceived as unjust and discuss the implications for the renunciation defense as well as attempt versus perpetration distinction. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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