(E)‐Trust and Its Function: Why We Shouldn't Apply Trust and Trustworthiness to Human–AI Relations.
With an increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, theorists have analyzed and argued for the promotion of trust in AI and trustworthy AI. Critics have objected that AI does not have the characteristics to be an appropriate subject for trust. However, this argumentation is open to count...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 40; no. 1; pp. 95 - 109 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Feb2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=161619263&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 161619263 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02643758 BQ0 jtl: Journal of Applied Philosophy issn: 02643758 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Feb2023 vid: 40 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 161619263 10.1111/japp.12613 ppf: 95 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 228KB tig: atl: (E)‐Trust and Its Function: Why We Shouldn't Apply Trust and Trustworthiness to Human–AI Relations. aug: au: Al, Pepijn affil: The Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London ON, , Canada su: Trust Artificial intelligence sug: subj: Trust Artificial intelligence ab: With an increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, theorists have analyzed and argued for the promotion of trust in AI and trustworthy AI. Critics have objected that AI does not have the characteristics to be an appropriate subject for trust. However, this argumentation is open to counterarguments. Firstly, rejecting trust in AI denies the trust attitudes that some people experience. Secondly, we can trust other non‐human entities, such as animals and institutions, so why can we not trust AI systems? Finally, human–AI trust is criticized based on a conception of human–human trust, which does not recognize the distinctiveness of the human–AI relationship. This article aims to refute these counterarguments based on the genealogical analyses of 'trust' and 'trustworthiness' of Karen Jones and Thomas Simpson, who show that trust and trustworthiness help to overcome vulnerabilities. This function of trust gives reason to use human–human trust as a standard. For this function, it is important that trustees are responsive to trust. While animals and institutions could be responsive, narrow AI systems are unable to be responsive to trust. Therefore, we should not apply trust to AI and instead direct our trust to those who can be responsive to and held responsible for our trust. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Applied Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Applied Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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