Selective Corporate Restructuring Strategy.

This article engages with a fundamental, but under‐theorised, fact: that modern UK and US corporate restructuring plans frequently impair only selected creditors, and frequently treat impaired creditors of equal rank differently. It starts from the premise that selectivity and differential treatment...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Modern Law Review Vol. 86; no. 2; pp. 436 - 465
Autores principales: Paterson, Sarah, Walters, Adrian
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Mar2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=161788640&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 161788640
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00267961
        D8H
      jtl: Modern Law Review
      issn: 00267961
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Mar2023
      vid: 86
      iid: 2
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        161788640
        10.1111/1468-2230.12767
      ppf: 436
      ppct: 29
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 290KB
      tig:
        atl: Selective Corporate Restructuring Strategy.
      aug:
        au:
          Paterson, Sarah
          Walters, Adrian
      su:
        Corporate reorganizations
        Debtor & creditor
        Corporate finance
        Capital investments
        Investment analysis
      sug:
        subj:
          Corporate reorganizations
          Debtor & creditor
          Corporate finance
          Capital investments
          Investment analysis
      ab: This article engages with a fundamental, but under‐theorised, fact: that modern UK and US corporate restructuring plans frequently impair only selected creditors, and frequently treat impaired creditors of equal rank differently. It starts from the premise that selectivity and differential treatment, while often justifiable, raise normative questions about the boundaries within which they ought to be permitted. It then reviews selective and differential strategies in three UK restructuring procedures, using US chapter 11 as a comparator. The core contention is that selectivity and differentiation are best regulated by the threat of independent review against a menu of relevant criteria. A menu of criteria is developed, designed to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate uses of selective and/or differential strategies, and these criteria are mapped onto the various UK restructuring law procedures and US chapter 11. The article concludes with some limited suggestions for reform directed mainly at the UK company voluntary arrangement.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Modern Law Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Modern Law Review
      holder: Wiley-Blackwell
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2023
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N