Sensory fields: the visual and the bodily.

Philosophers of perception have been readier to postulate the existence of a visual field than to acknowledge sensory fields in other modalities. In this paper, I argue that the set of phenomenal features that philosophers have relied on when positing a visual field aptly characterise, mutatis mutan...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 180; no. 2; pp. 679 - 701
Autor principal: Serrahima, Carlota
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Feb2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=161854461&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 161854461
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00318116
        4L8
      jtl: Philosophical Studies
      issn: 00318116
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Feb2023
      vid: 180
      iid: 2
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        161854461
        10.1007/s11098-022-01838-x
      ppf: 679
      ppct: 22
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 973KB
      tig:
        atl: Sensory fields: the visual and the bodily.
      aug:
        au: Serrahima, Carlota
        affil: Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
      su:
        Visual fields
        Phenomenology
        Perception (Philosophy)
        O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson, 1950-
        Skepticism
      sug:
        subj:
          Visual fields
          Phenomenology
          Perception (Philosophy)
          O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson, 1950-
          Skepticism
      keyword:
        Bodily experience
        Bodily ownership
        Sensory field
        Somatosensation
      ab: Philosophers of perception have been readier to postulate the existence of a visual field than to acknowledge sensory fields in other modalities. In this paper, I argue that the set of phenomenal features that philosophers have relied on when positing a visual field aptly characterise, mutatis mutandis, bodily sensation. I argue, in particular, that in localised bodily sensations we experience the body as a sensory field. I first motivate this claim for the case of haptic touch, and then generalise it to other kinds of bodily sensation. I demonstrate the theoretical fruitfulness of this notion of a bodily field for the debate on the phenomenology of bodily ownership.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Philosophical Studies
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2023
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N