Why the manipulation argument fails: determinism does not entail perfect prediction.
Determinism is frequently understood as implying the possibility of perfect prediction. This possibility then functions as an assumption in the Manipulation Argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Yet this assumption is mistaken. As a result, arguments that rely on it fail to...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 180; no. 2; pp. 451 - 472 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=161854464&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 161854464 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2023 vid: 180 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 161854464 10.1007/s11098-022-01882-7 ppf: 451 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 958KB tig: atl: Why the manipulation argument fails: determinism does not entail perfect prediction. aug: au: Deery, Oisin Nahmias, Eddy affil: Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Levels 6 and 7, 25B Wally's Walk, 2109, Sydney, NSW, Australia Department of Philosophy, York University, S448 Ross Building, 4700 Keele Street, M3J 1P3, Toronto, ON, Canada Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, 25 Park Place, Suite 1600, 30303, Atlanta, GA, USA su: Determinism (Philosophy) Neuroscientists Responsibility Probability theory Data analysis sug: subj: Determinism (Philosophy) Neuroscientists Responsibility Probability theory Data analysis ab: Determinism is frequently understood as implying the possibility of perfect prediction. This possibility then functions as an assumption in the Manipulation Argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Yet this assumption is mistaken. As a result, arguments that rely on it fail to show that determinism would rule out human free will. We explain why determinism does not imply the possibility of perfect prediction in any world with laws of nature like ours, since it would be impossible for an agent to predict with certainty any future event that is causally influenced by events outside her own backward light cone yet inside the backward light cone of the future event. This is the light-cone limit and it undermines the Manipulation Argument or limits what this argument can tell us about the relevance of determinism to free will. We also respond to objections that the light-cone limit is irrelevant to the Manipulation Argument. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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