How to fight corruption: Carrots and sticks.
I present a model of corruption with incomplete information where the bureaucrat may request a bribe from the citizen for providing a service. I show that corruption is detrimental to social welfare and consider a new policy to prevent it. I propose punishing bureaucrats who take bribes and rewardin...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 61; no. 2; pp. 413 - 430 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=162014039&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 162014039 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2023 vid: 61 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 162014039 10.1111/ecin.13125 ppf: 413 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 646KB tig: atl: How to fight corruption: Carrots and sticks. aug: au: Knyazev, Dmitriy affil: Department of Business Decisions and Analytics, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria su: Corruption Reward (Psychology) Bribery Social services Bureaucracy Carrots sug: subj: Corruption Reward (Psychology) Bribery Social services Bureaucracy Perishable Prepared Food Manufacturing Other Vegetable (except Potato) and Melon Farming Other Individual and Family Services Carrots keyword: bribery bureaucracy corruption punishment and reward bribery bureaucracy corruption punishment and reward ab: I present a model of corruption with incomplete information where the bureaucrat may request a bribe from the citizen for providing a service. I show that corruption is detrimental to social welfare and consider a new policy to prevent it. I propose punishing bureaucrats who take bribes and rewarding citizens who report such cases. Neither punishment nor rewards can prevent corruption alone. However, the proper combination of punishment and rewards completely prevents corruption. I also show that higher bureaucracy increases corruption in equilibrium and makes it harder to combat it. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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